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There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appear to be so expensive,
and why do input suppliers engage in the business of lending money? This paper addresses
and answers both questions analysing the interaction between the ﬁnancial and the industrial
aspects of the supplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limited enforce-
ability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantage over banks in lending to their
customers because they hold the extra threat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods.
Suppliers may also act as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidity shocks
that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relatively high implicit interest rates
of trade credit result from the existence of default and insurance premia. The implications
of the model are examined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on a
panel of UK ﬁrms.
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Trade credit arises when a supplier allows a customer to delay the payment of goods
already delivered. It is generally associated with the purchase of intermediate goods.
Empirical evidence shows that the implicit interest rate in a trade credit agreement is
generally very high compared to the rates of bank credit. In spite of this apparent high
cost, trade credit is widely used and represents an important proportion of ﬁrms’ ﬁnance.
I ti st h e r e f o r es u r p r i s i n gt h a tb a n k sd on o tt a k eo v e rt h i sp o t e n t i a l l yp r o ﬁtable business,
oﬀe r i n gm o r ec r e d i tl i n e st oﬁnance commercial transactions. This paper addresses the
following questions at the heart of the trade credit puzzle: i) Why is trade credit so
expensive? and ii) Why is trade ﬁnanced by suppliers instead of banks?
In our model a ﬁnancial relationship between a supplier and a customer emerges as a
natural consequence of their commercial interaction, despite the existence of a competi-
tive banking sector. This is based on two basic elements. On the one hand, suppliers are
able to enforce debt repayment better than banks, as they hold the threat of stopping the
supply of intermediate goods to their customers. On the other hand suppliers may act
as liquidity providers, supporting their customers whenever they experience temporary
liquidity shocks. The necessary condition for these elements to exist is the existence of a
surplus that will be split between suppliers and customers if they stay together. In other
words, there must be a link between the supplier and the customer that makes it costly
for the customer to ﬁnd alternative suppliers and makes it costly for the supplier to loose
its current customers. As a result, the high interest rate of trade credit, is justiﬁed by
the existence of a default premium and an insurance premium. The default premium
accounts for the fact that, in our model, suppliers lend when banks are not willing to
lend. They use their extra enforceability power to lend on the basis of returns that
are non-veriﬁable and stochastic. This makes trade credit more risky than bank debt.
The insurance premium is related to the fact that suppliers foresee the future needs of
liquidity of their customers. As they know that they may have to bail out customers in
need of extra liquidity, they will charge them a premium for providing insurance against
potential liquidity shocks.
The reason why trade credit appears to be an expensive form of ﬁnance lies within
the structure of a standard trade credit contract. A typical deal normally involves three
elements: a discount on the price agreed if the buyer pays early; the number of days that
qualify for early payment; and the maximum number of days for payment. For example,
a common contract called “2-10 net 30” means that if customers pay within ten days
1of delivery they qualify for a 2% discount. Otherwise they can pay up to 30 days after
delivery. The discount for early payment implies an interest rate that the customer
pays for the credit received. In the case of the “2-10 net 30” contract, the customer
is eﬀectively receiving credit at a 2% rate for 20 days. Thus the equivalent one year
interest rate of this deal is about 44%. This is an extremely high rate compared with
the market rate that a bank would charge for a similar type of loan. Other common deals
also have very high interest rates.1 Despite this high cost, trade credit still constitutes
a considerable share of ﬁrms’ ﬁnance. For example, trade credit accounts for roughly
one ﬁfth of the total assets of a representative ﬁrm and about one half of the short-term
debt in two diﬀerent samples of medium sized UK ﬁrms and small sized US ﬁrms, as
shown in Table 1.2
Table 1
Relative Size of Trade Credit
(Average Over Firms)
Country Dataset Trade Credit/Assets Trade Credit/Debt Trade Credit/ST Debt
UK FAME 17% 43% 52%
US NSSB 18% 34% 58%
Furthermore, these levels are higher in periods when buyers face temporary liquidity
shocks. Suppliers seem to lend to their customers experiencing ﬁnancial trouble, even
when banks are not willing to lend. This additional lending may occur through ﬁnancing
a higher proportion of purchased goods or by extending the agreed maturity of the loans.
Furthermore, in many circumstaces, this extra lending occurs via late payment of already
extended debts. For example, in the NSSB sample 59% of the ﬁrms declared that they
had made some payments after the due date during the last year. These late payments
do not usually carry a penalty for the customers.
The role of suppliers as debt collectors is in line with the fact that trade credit
tends to be higher in small, young and high growth ﬁr m st h a ta r et h eo n e sw i t hh i g h e r
diﬃculties in accessing other forms of ﬁnance.3 However, in the empirical part of the
1Ng et al (1999) ﬁnd that “2-10 net 30” is the most common deal in a sample of US ﬁrms. Other
common deals such as “8-30 net 50” imply even higher implicit interest rates. In this case the annual
implied interest rate is 358%
2FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) is a database of medium-sized UK ﬁrms from 1993 until
1999 (see Section 5.1), while NSSB (National Survey of Small Busines) is a 1993 sample of 3000 small
US ﬁrms.
3See Nilsen (1994) (1999), Elliehausen and Wolken (1993), Berger and Udell (1998).
2paper, we ﬁnd that the relationship between the age of a ﬁrm and the levels of trade
credit used is non-linear. New-born ﬁrms start with low levels of trade credit but it
builds up very quickly in the early years of a ﬁrm’s life. This reinforces our hypothesis
that trade credit is related to the existence of a link between suppliers and customers. If
this link takes time to build up, trade credit should also grow as the relationship evolves.
The results of the model are consistent with the existing stylised facts, in particular
with the high implicit interest rates and the extensive use of trade credit. Furthermore,
in Section 5 we test some of the empirical implications of the model, ﬁnding support for
the existence of a link between suppliers and customers that takes time to bulid and for
the help of suppliers to their customers that experience temporary problems.
This is a new explanation for the characteristics of trade credit that is, to some
extent, complementary to the ones of previous articles.4 For example, trade credit can
be seen like in Ferris (1981) as a means of payment to reduce transaction costs when the
timing of the arrival of new supplies is uncertain. This is consistent with the existence
of a free delayed payment period like the ﬁr s tt e nd a y si nt h e“ 2 - 1 0n e t3 0 ”d e a lo f
the above example. However, the model remains silent about why trade credit is so
expensive and why ﬁrms are willing to pay such cost. For example in the NSSB sample
46.4% of the ﬁrms forgo the discount for early payment in at least half of their purchases.
Other literature considers trade credit as a ﬁnancial instrument. Biais and Gollier (1997)
provide an explanation for trade credit based on the existence of some form of asymmetric
information; Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988) highlight the possibilities that
trade credit oﬀers for price discrimination;5 and there is a new stream of literature that
focuses on the role of trade credit in liquidation, default or renegotiation. Among the
latter, Frank and Maksimovic (1999) explain the existence of trade credit as a result
of suppliers having an advantage in liquidating intermediate goods in case of default
by their buyers.6 On the other hand Wilner (2000) assumes that suppliers incur sunk
4For an extensive review of theoretical and empirical literature on Trade Credit see Mian and Smith
(1992), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Smith (1995). There are also articles that base the existence of
trade credit on tax advantages as Brick and Fung (1984). See also Emery (1984) and Schwartz (1974)
for models in which suppliers have superior access to ﬁnancial markets.
5Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988) and Smith (1987) link the asymmetric information and
the price discrimination literature by showing that suppliers can use credit terms to screen their cus-
tomers in the presence of asymmetric information. The idea of price discrimination through trade
credit stresses the fact that from an economist’s point of view it is sometimes impossible to diﬀerentiate
between prices paid for intermediate goods and interest rates. The nature of a seller-buyer relationship
is both ﬁnancial and commercial and these two aspects can not be easily disentangled.
6This advantage comes from the fact that suppliers can claim back supplied intermediate goods in
3costs that are speciﬁc to their buyers, so in the case of renegotiation of debts, they give
more concessions to customers than banks. Both models conclude that suppliers will
specialise in ﬁnancing buyers with low creditworthiness, for whom liquidation is more
likely to occur. High interest rates associated with trade credit reﬂect the fact that low
quality ﬁrms are self-selected towards being ﬁnanced by their suppliers.
Our model diﬀers from those in the existing literature in various aspects. In the
ﬁrst place, we justify the existence of trade credit on the basis of suppliers being able to
enforce debt repayment better than banks. This extra enforceability power comes from
the existence of a link that makes both suppliers and customers costly to substitute.
In the model this link takes the form of intermediate goods being speciﬁc to the buyer.
Secondly, the existence of this link also justiﬁes the fact that suppliers will help customers
in trouble because they are costly to substitute. This help is not just restricted to
renegotiation in case of default, but is more of an insurance against liquidity shocks that
the customer may face. We model this an explicit bail-out in the form of extra funds or
extra goods delivered on credit, but it can also be seen as extra ﬂexibility in the terms of
payment. The ﬁnal diﬀerence is that, in equilibrium, all ﬁr m su s eb o t ht r a d ec r e d i ta n d
bank credit, even if we assume that banks are relatively more competitive lenders than
suppliers. Suppliers can issue trade credit when their customers have already borrowed
from banks up to the point where banks are not willing to lend any more funds.7
We also test empirically some of the implications of the model with an extensive
pannel of UK ﬁrms applying standard panel data techniques and also non-parametric
methods. This empirical evidence shows how trade credit trends to be higher the higher
the link between suppliers and customers, also relating measures of ﬁrm performance to
t r a d ec r e d i tw eﬁnd evidence of the support given by suppliers to their customers when
they experience small problems. Finally the evolution of trade credit with respect to
case of default and have the distribution channels to re-sell them, if they are not too buyer speciﬁc. The
ability to repossess these commodities will be more or less important depending on the average length
of stay of non processed goods in the customer’s ﬁrm compared with the maturity of trade credit. Note
that while our model predicts higher levels of trade credit when inputs are buyer speciﬁc, Frank and
Maksimovic (1999) predict the opposite relationship.
7So far, only Biais and Gollier (1997) and Frank and Maksimovic (1999) had an equilibrium result
where bank and trade credit were mixed optimally. According to Biais and Gollier, customers choose the
right proportion of trade credit vs bank credit to commit credibly to avoid collusion with their suppliers.
In Frank and Maksimovic low quality buyers get only trade credit while high quality buyers get mixed
ﬁnance. Both models rely on the existence of a single monopolistic ﬁnancier. Our model proposes an
alternative explanation for this mix, based on the veriﬁablility of the returns of the customer. The
results of section 5.4 support our hypothesis, showing a high sensitivity of this mix with respect to the
levels of collateral of the ﬁrm.
4collateral levels and liquidity also seems to support the implications of our theoretical
model.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we explain the model; in Section
3 the question of suppliers as insurance providers is explored in more depth, comparing
supplier insurance with alternative forms of insurance; in Section 4 we calculate the
implicit interest rates of trade credit; in Section 5 the empirical implications of the
model are explored and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model explains the existence of trade credit as a natural result between ﬁrms that
are tied by commercial or technological links, in a context where debt repayment may
be diﬃcult to enforce.
The idea behind this paper is that a supplier and a customer are more productive
the longer they stay together. In other words, there are sunk costs, learning-by-doing
processes, tailor-made products and so on that link suppliers and customers in a way
that makes it costly for them to switch to another partner. The extra proﬁts of staying
together will normally be split according to the bargaining power of the agents, gener-
ating an interior division of this surplus. Because the customer gets part of this extra
surplus, the supplier may be more eﬃcient than banks in enforcing debt repayment hav-
ing the additional threat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods in case of default
by the customer.8 On the other hand, given that the supplier also gets part of this
extra surplus, she will act as lender of last resort if the customer experiences temporary
liquidity needs.
The high interest payments associated with trade credit can then be justiﬁed by two
extra premia on top of the market interest rate. In the ﬁrst place there is a premium
that suppliers get for providing credit when banks are not willing to lend. We call
this premium the default premium. Secondly suppliers will also demand an insurance
premium, due to the fact that they may be asked to provide extra liquidity in the future.
The aim of the model is not only to give an explanation for the existence and high
cost of trade credit, but also to provide testable implications that can support or reject
our hypotheses. Some of the features of the model, like having an explicit startup stage
8In our model, like in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) Hart and Moore (1994) (1998) and Hart (1995),
debt contracts can not be enforced in themselves, so it is necessary that the lender has some external
threat in order to generate some kind of lending. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) suggest that the threat
of not reﬁnancing is what allows debtors to eﬀectively claim back debts.
5or liquidity shocks that are correlated with the performance of the ﬁrm, bring some
complexity to the model that may seem unnecessary from a purely theoretical point of
view but are in place to bring the model closer to the empirical evidence of section 5.
In this section, we begin by describing the diﬀerent agents involved in the model.
Throughout the article, and for the sake of clarity, we will refer to the supplier as “she”
and the customer as “he”. Secondly, we proceed to explain the production technology of
the customers, with special attention given to the existence of a link between suppliers
and customers. Then we describe the bargaining between the agents and the structure of
cash ﬂows implied by this bargaining. Next we conjecture a certain equilibrium structure
and see that, under certain conditions this, is the only equilibrium of the model. Finally
we ﬁnd the equilibrium values of the diﬀerent endogenous parameters of the model.
2.1 Agents
The model is in discrete time with inﬁnite periods. All agents live forever, are risk neutral
and maximise future discounted proﬁts. There are three types of agents in the model:
banks, suppliers and customers. Banks are deep pockets, having access to unlimited
funds. They discount future cash ﬂows with a factor β<1. This implies that banks
are willing lend or borrow at a market interest rate i such that β ≡ 1
1+i. Suppliers
a r ea l s od e e pp o c k e t sw i t ht h es a m ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rβ; they are therefore also willing to
lend or borrow at the same rate of banks. They also provide their customers with the
necessary intermediate goods necessary for production. These goods are produced with
a technology with constant returns to scale, we normalise the cost to produce each unit
of intermediate goods to one. These inputs may be of two kinds; generic goods which
can be provided by any supplier and serve any customer; or speciﬁc goods, which have
been tailored to the needs of a single customer and can only be provided by a particular
supplier. Finally, customers are endowed with a limited amount of wealth w;t h e ya r e
also relatively impatient with respect to deep pockets, having a discount factor δ<β .
Each customer can only run one business at a time. Every period, the customer buys a
variable amount I of intermediate goods delivered by a single supplier. By transforming
these inputs, the customer obtains some net income at the end of the period that can
either be AhI or AlI where Ah >A l. These returns are stochastic, and the probability
of obtaining a high or a low return depends on whether the production process uses a
startup technology with low expected productivity that transforms generic inputs; or a
mature technology with high expected productivity that transforms speciﬁc inputs.
Assumption 1: Suppliers are more abundant than customers.
6So in the absence of any link between suppliers and customers, customers can cost-
lessly search for a supplier that sells them inputs at cost value.
2.2 Technology
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Initially when a supplier and a customer meet for the very ﬁr s tt i m et h e ym u s tw o r k
with the technology that uses generic inputs. This represents a startup stage where
the customer tries diﬀerent ideas until ﬁnding a successful one. With a probability
(1−γ) the idea is unsuccessful, so the customer receives a return of AlI and remains in
the startup stage for the next period. However with some small probability γ the idea is
successful. A successful idea gives the customer returns of AhI and allows them to use
a more productive technology that uses speciﬁc inputs in the next period. We call this
technology speciﬁc or also mature technology. When the customer uses this mature
technology there is a probability (1 − υ) >γthat the project is successful without any
further payment, so the customer gets returns of AhI and can use the mature technology
again in the next period. However, with a probability υ the customer may experience a
liquidity shock. The liquidity shock represents any kind of problem that the ﬁrm may
experience that requires an additional disbursement of money to continue producing.
The structure of this liquidity shock is the following: The cost of the shock is LI.I f
the ﬁrm invests LI in solving “the problem” then with probability k the process will
be successful, and with probability (1 − k) the project will be unsuccessful. However if
7the ﬁrm decides not to invest this sum, the project is sure to be unsuccessful. Again
a successful project entails returns equal to AhI and the possibility to keep using the
mature technology while an unsuccessful project means going back to the startup stage
with returns equal to AlI.9
A good example of what we mean by this liquidity shock is the existence of a break-
down in the production process that costs LI to repair. If the ﬁrm does not repair the
breakdown the project is deﬁnitely unsuccessful, while if the breakdown is repaired the
project is successful with probability k. We can also see this liquidity shock as a delay
in production. At the end of the period, the customer has to decide wether to get an
unsuccessful return or wait some more time t to get a succesful return with probability
k. Therefore we can see LI a st h et i m ev a l u eo fd e l a y i n gr e t u r n sf o rt i m et.
T h e r ei so n ei m p o r t a n tc h a r a c t e r i s t i co ft h em a t u r et e c h n o l o g y ,t h a ti sc r u c i a lf o r
the understanding of the model. When the customer has already been successful in the
startup stage and is about to use the speciﬁc technology for the ﬁrst time, he has to
choose which supplier is going to be the one that will produce the necessary inputs. The
customer faces a competitive market of suppliers willing to be the chosen one to produce
these tailor-made inputs. From then onwards, at any point in time, a customer or a
supplier can resolve their relationship and switch to another partner. However, given
that the inputs are speciﬁc, after switching they must start using the generic technology
again. The supplier owns the blueprint or the knowledge to produce the customised
inputs that are necessary in the mature technology.
So a customer can lose the advantages of a speciﬁc inputs technology, either because
there has been an unsuccessful period or by switching to a diﬀerent supplier.
Assumption 2: L<K (Ah − Al)
So it is always proﬁtable for the customer to pay the liquidity shock if she has
suﬃc i e n tf u n d s .I ti sc o n v e n i e n tt od e ﬁne α = υk+(1−υ) as the ex ante success prob-
ability, conditional on always paying the liquidity shock. We are restricting ourselves to
parametrisations that make it optimal to pay the liquidity shock; therefore, conditional
on always paying the liquidity shock, the choice of technology can be summarised by a
Markov process with transition probabilities γ and α, a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 . 10
9The liquidity shock is modelled in a similar fashion to Holmstr˝ om and Tirole (1998). From a
theoretical point of view the shock need not be correlated with the probability of success of the project.
However, as we will see, this slightly more complex model is more realistic when it comes to empirical
estimation.
10The shock probability υ is correlated with the success probability α, so even though the choice of
the production technology is a Markov process, the whole setup is not.
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Assumption 3: Structure of returns.
A proportion of investment cI is consumed by the customer during the production
process.11 Also a proportion θI of the value of the ﬁrm can be used as collateral to
secure debt repayment. The remainder of returns are not veriﬁable and can not be
collateralised. By not veriﬁa b l e ,w em e a nt h a ti ti sn o tp o s s i b l et ow r i t eac o n t r a c t
that implies some commitment of these future returns. This precludes in particular the
writing of a standard debt contract. It is useful to redeﬁne these remaining returns as
follows.
AhI = cI + θI + RI
AlI = cI + θI + rI
Thus RI and rI represent the part of the returns of the customer that can be freely
used but is genuinely non veriﬁable, as the rest of the returns can either be backed by
collateral, or must be consumed.
Assumption 4: β(θ + αR +( 1− α)r − υL) < 1
The expected discounted returns of the ﬁrm, excluding the ones that must be con-
sumed, do not cover investment costs, not even when the technology is speciﬁca n dw e
use the discount factor β. This assumption implies that inﬁnite investment is not pos-
sible, not even if the customers could somehow commit the non-collateralisable part of
11The existence of cI rules out the inﬁnite postponement of consumption and can be seen as private
beneﬁts that the entrepreneur enjoys while producing, or wages, or as a minimum level of dividends.
9their returns.12 We do not discount the proportion of returns c that must be consumed,
because it cannot be used to repay debts even if the customer wished to.
Assumption 5: δ(c + θ + γR+( 1 − γ)r) > 1
T h ep r o j e c th a sp o s i t i v en e tp r e s e n tv a l u e( NPV). Overall returns, including the part
that is consumed by the customer, are bigger than the level of investment, even when
the technology is generic and we discount using the customer’s discount factor δ.
2.3 Bargaining
We assume the following simple bargaining process to determine the cash ﬂow structure
between both agents: The supplier makes a “take it or leave it” oﬀer to the customer
at the beginning of every period; the customer can either accept it or switch to another
supplier. Obviously, if the customer is using speciﬁc inputs and switches to another
supplier, he will have to use the generic technology again.
The only subgame perfect equilibrium of this bargaining game is that the supplier
will make an oﬀer to the customer that leaves her indiﬀerent between accepting the
oﬀer or switching to another supplier. This generates three possible diﬀerent surplus
distributions between the supplier and the customer, depending on whether the customer
is using the startup technology, the mature technology for the ﬁrst time or the mature
technology after the ﬁrst time.
When a customer is using the startup technology that uses generic inputs, sup-
pliers are perfectly interchangeable. This means that the customer has in fact all the
bargaining power in the relationship, since the customer can costlessly search until he
ﬁnds the supplier that sells the intermediate goods at cost value.
When a customer is using the mature technology that uses speciﬁc inputs, switch-
i n gt oad i ﬀerent supplier implies that the customer would lose the advantages of the
mature technology and would have to return to the startup stage again. Therefore the
supplier will make a “take it or leave it” oﬀer that extracts all the extra surplus. The
customer will accept this oﬀer as long as it is as good as the outside option of switching
to another supplier. Let p denote the proportion of investment that the supplier takes
as surplus share, being thus pI the total amount received by the supplier when the
customer uses the mature technology, on top of the cost of the intermediate goods I.
However, there is also a special period when the customer has just been successful
using the startup technology and therefore is going to use the mature technology
12However this does not necessarily mean that ﬁrms decrease size with time, since it does not preclude
that θ + αR +( 1− α)r − υL > 1.
10for the ﬁrst time. At this stage, customers have a successful idea and they have to
choose which supplier is going to produce the necessary speciﬁc inputs. They still face a
competitive market of suppliers that know that if they are the “chosen one” they will be
locked to that customer and will be able to extract some surplus from the customer in the
future. Therefore when suppliers make their oﬀer they must “bribe” the customer with a
payment that corresponds to the expected discounted value of all the future payments pI
that will be received in further periods. We call d the proportion of investment paid as
“bribe” to the customers; so, in this ﬁrst mature period, the customer pays I in exchange
for inputs, but receives dI from the supplier. Note that this cash ﬂow look precisely like a
debt contract; dI can be seen as a loan that suppliers make to their customers when they
start using speciﬁc technology, while pI are the payments of interests and repayment of
capital that the customer will make in future periods. Competition between suppliers
ensures that dI is determined in such a way that suppliers just break even in expected
terms.
2.4 The Customer’s Investment Decision
We begin conjecturing the following equilibrium structure: the customer invests all
available funds in the project, even when in the startup stage; when the liquidity shock
hits in the mature stage the supplier bails out the customer by paying the cost of the
shock; the customer does not keep any precautionary saving or get any insurance against
the shock to force the supplier paying for it. Through sections 2.4 and 2.5 we will ﬁnd
the necessary conditions for this equilibrium to exist. In section 2.6 we will derive the
unique equilibrium values for the cash ﬂows p and d, while in section 3 we will see that
this insurance agreement between the supplier and the customer is the optimal one.
We can now ﬁnd expressions for the value functions of suppliers and customers.
By value function we mean the Bellman equation that represents the overall expected
discounted value of the future returns of a ﬁrm. We express these value functions per
unit of wealth of the customer ﬁrm, so to get the overall value of the customer’s ﬁrm, one
has to multiply the relevant value function times the current endowment of the customer.
We name S the per unit value function of a customer using the startup technology, N
the value function of a customer using the mature technology for the ﬁrst time and M
the value function per unit of a customer using the mature technology after the ﬁrst
period.
For example, if V denotes the overall value function of a customer in the startup
stage, the relevant expression will be: V = wS = δ(cI + γRIN +( 1− γ)rIS). That is,
11the value function of the startup stage is the discounted level of consumption at the end
of this period cI plus the discounted value of the future value of the ﬁrm. This future
value will be with probability (1−γ) the value of a ﬁrm with initial wealth Ir that still
uses the startup technology, and with probability γ the value of a ﬁrm with wealth IR
that starts using the mature technology. These are the relevant sizes of the ﬁrm in the
next period. If ﬁrms borrow up to their collateral limit, θI has to be used to repay bank
debts; also cI must be consumed, so the initial wealth of the ﬁrm in the next period will
be Ir if this period is unsuccessful and IR if this period is successful. Taking common
factor I and given that, as we will see later on, when a ﬁrm uses generic technology
I = w
1−βθ , there is an expression for S that does not depend on the level of wealth of
the customer’s ﬁrm: S = 1
(1−βθ)δ(c + γRN +( 1− γ)rS). Remember that S is the value
function in present value per unit of wealth of using the startup technology, N the value
function on the ﬁrst year when supplier and customer use the mature technology, and
M is the value function of the mature technology thereafter. The whole set of value




δ(c + γRN +( 1− γ)rS) (1)
N =
1
(1 − d − βθ)
δ(c + αRM +( 1− α)rS) (2)
M =
1
(1 + p − βθ)
δ(c + αRM +( 1− α)rS) (3)
The ﬁrst term of each value function is the level of leverage that the ﬁrm has in
every stage, or in other words, how much the customer needs to downpay per unit
of investment. To understand this term we have to see what are the eﬀective levels
of investment that maximise the amount of funds committed in the project when the
c u s t o m e rb o r r o w sa sm u c ha sp o s s i b l ei ne a c hs t a g e .W h e nc u s t o m e r sa r ei nt h estartup
stage they cannot commit to repay any funds on top of the collateral value of the ﬁrm
θI. The discount rate of both banks and suppliers is β; to account for some competitive
advantage of banks as lenders we assume that bank lending weakly dominates supplier
lending, so all collateralised credit will be lent by banks. The customers will maximise
t h es i z eo ft h e i rﬁrm by investing all their wealth w and the funds that they can borrow
from banks βθI. So I = w + βθI ⇒ I = w
1−βθ. When customers are using the mature
technology for the ﬁrst time they receive extra funds dI coming from their suppliers,
so their leverage is higher than in the search case. The level of investment will then be
I = w+βθI+dI ⇒ I = w
1−βθ−d. Finally, when customers are using mature technology
12after the ﬁrst time they have to share the extra surplus with their suppliers by paying
them pI on top of the cost of the intermediate goods I. The level of leverage thus goes
down and I = w + βθI − pI ⇒ I = w
1−βθ+p.13
The second term of each value function is ﬁrstly the discounted value of this period’s
consumption, which is constant per unit of investment, and secondly the future value
of the ﬁrm, which depends on the kind of technology that is being used.14 There is no
trace in these value functions of the liquidity shock. This is because since customers
are not holding any savings they will ask their supplier to pay for this liquidity shock.
Section 2.5 shows that the supplier will agree to pay it.
Is investing all possible funds the optimal strategy? Given that customers have lim-
ited borrowing capacity, the positive net present value rule (NPV) becomes a necessary
condition to invest. However it is not suﬃcient, since customers will choose the strategy
with the maximum NPV and not just any strategy with positive NPV. Two potential
strategies could yield a higher NPV than investing as much as possible in the search
stage. One is to split the project into a series of inﬁnitely small ones to maximise the
probability of at least one success. This is precluded by the assumption that customers
can only follow one project at a time. The other strategy is an intertemporal version of
the previous one and would be to invest a small amount of money in the startup project
and leave the rest in a bank account until a successful idea arrives. This strategy can
be excluded if the instantaneous consumption associated with investing in the startup
strategy is bigger than the option value of waiting for one period to see if the project is
successful.
Proposition 1 There is a threshold level δ
∗ ∈ (0,β) such that for every δ<δ
∗ it is
optimal for the customer to invest all available funds in the project even in the startup
stage.
Proof. See Appendix 1
Assumption 6: δ<δ
∗
We assume that customers have a low enough δ to commit all their available funds,
even in the startup stage. In equilibrium the mature technology is going to be at least as
13We can reinterpret the cash ﬂows between the supplier and the customer in terms of prices. The
customer is eﬀectively paying a price 1 per unit of investment when using the startup technology, a
price (1 − d) when using the mature technology for the ﬁrst time and (1 + p) when using the mature
technology from then onwards.
14The value functions are well deﬁned. The fact that d is equivalent to a discounted ﬂow of future
returns joint with Assumption 4 guarantees that d<(1 − βθ) ,s oi n ﬁnite investment is ruled out.
13proﬁtable as the startup technology (otherwise the customer would switch to the startup
technology again), so this assumption also guarantees that the customer will invest all
available funds when using the mature technology.
2.5 The Supplier’s Decision
The supplier has basically three decisions to make in the model: how much surplus to
extract when supplying speciﬁc goods (determination of p); how much to oﬀer on the
ﬁrst period providing speciﬁc inputs (determination of d); and ﬁnally whether to bail
out the customer if the liquidity shock hits and the customer has made no provisions to
face it.
We use lower-case letters to indicate the equivalent value functions of the supplier,
that is s is the value function of a supplier that produces intermediate goods for a
supplier that uses the startup technology and so on.
2.5.1 The Bail-out Decision
Proposition 2 Suppliers will always pay for the liquidity shock as long as customers
have no funds to pay for it and the cost of searching for another customer exceeds the
cost of paying for the shock.
Assumption 7 L<k R
δ(α−γ)(R−r))
1−βθ−(β−δ)αR−δ(α−γ)r+βυkR
This is the necessary and suﬃcient condition that guarantees that L<k (Rm−rs),
so suppliers would rather pay L to save their customers from failure with probability
k than losing them and searching for new ones.15 We will see in section 3 what would
happen if the condition did not hold.
Given that the customer invests all available funds and that suppliers will bail them




β(γRn+( 1− γ)rs) (4)
n =
1
(1 − d − βθ)
{−d + β(αRm +( 1− α)rs− υL)} (5)
m =
1
(1 + p − βθ)
{p + β(αRm +( 1− α)rs− υL)} (6)
15If suppliers did not bail out their customers, they would have to search for a new one. Later on we
will see that in equilibrium s =0 . This means that suppliers will then bail out their customers as long
as L<k R m . In equilibrium this condition becomes L<k R
δ(α−γ)(R−r))
1−βθ−(β−δ)αR−δ(α−γ)r+βυkR
14The value functions are expressed in NPV per unit of wealth of the customer.16 The
payoﬀs between the supplier and the customer not only aﬀect the level of leverage of the
ﬁrm, but also represent an inﬂow or outﬂow of funds into the suppliers wealth. The term
−υL appears in the last two equations because if the liquidity shock hits, customers will
ask for these extra funds from their suppliers and they will be willing to pay. We will
also see in Section 3 that using the suppliers as liquidity providers is the optimal strategy
for both suppliers and customers. Using this implicit insurance provided by suppliers
dominates other alternatives such as precautionary saving or other types of insurance
with third parties.
2.5.2 The Determination of the Initial Payment from Supplier to Customer
When using speciﬁc inputs for the ﬁrst time, customers have to choose which supplier
will produce these speciﬁc inputs from that period onwards. Given that suppliers are
relatively abundant, the fact that they can make a “take it or leave it” oﬀer gives them
no advantage since the customers will keep on searching until they ﬁnd a supplier oﬀering
a deal that implies a zero NPV for the supplier. This means that suppliers will pay a
quantity of money dI that makes n =0 .
Proposition 3 d gives the customer all the discounted surplus of the relationship mak-
ing n =0 .
2.5.3 The Determination of Further Payments from Customer to Supplier
When the customers are already using speciﬁci n p u t sa f t e r w a r d si ti sc o s t l yf o rt h e m
to switch to another supplier because it would mean that they would have to use a
generic technology again. Because of this the suppliers can use their bargaining power
to extract some of the extra surplus that a speciﬁc technology produces, as compared
with a generic technology.
Proposition 4 Suppliers will extract all the extra surplus from the customer when using
the mature technology after the ﬁrst period, making M=S.
Proof. See Appendix 1
16Note that customer’s value functions are expressed in PVand supplier ones are in NPV this is purely
for notational convenience. The expression for s is written as if the same supplier would carry on with
speciﬁc production in the next period. This is not necessarily true, but later on we will see that the
abundance of suppliers guarantees that n =0and s =0 , so the speciﬁcaton for s is quite irrelevant.
15Suppliers have a trade oﬀ in the determination of p. On the one hand, the higher
p the higher proportion of surplus that goes to the supplier, but on the other hand,
increasing p reduces the leverage and the growth rate of the customer, thus potentially
reducing the future surplus for both agents. However assumption 4 guarantees that the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and therefore extracting as much surplus as possible is optimal
from the supplier’s point of view.
So suppliers will extract all the extra surplus. That is pI will be such that customers
are indiﬀerent between staying with their current supplier or switching to a new one. In
terms of the value functions, p will be such that M = S.
2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium values for p and d must satisfy the participation constraints of the
agents. That is, all supplier value functions (in NPV) must be bigger or equal to 0
and all customer value functions (in PV per unit committed) must be bigger than one.
There are six value functions and eight endogenous parameters. The two other conditions
necessary to solve for all the endogenous parameters of the model are n =0and M = S
that come from the only subgame perfect equilibrium in the bargaining game.
In ﬁrst place the condition n =0together with equation (4) implies that necessarily
s =0 . This is quite intuitive since in the startup stage the supplier just covers costs,
and depending on the outcome of production it will lead to a subsequent period that
can be a startup period again or a ﬁrst mature period with zero NPV. Ecuations (5)
and (6) with s =0fully determine the relationship between p and d. In essence d must
be equal to the expected future ﬂow of p in the following periods, minus the expected





(1 + p − βθ) − βαR
−
(1 + p − βθ)




We can deﬁne (1+g)= αR
1−βθ+p, which is the expected rate of growth of the customer
ﬁrm (and also of p)o ne a c hf o l l o w i n gp e r i o da n du s eβ = 1
1+i to rearrange (7) as
d =
(1 + g)p − υL
i − g
(8)
This is the formula of a growing perpetuity with an interest rate i a n dg r o w t hr a t e
g. So the initial payment of the supplier d is equivalent to a perpetuity that pays
(1 + g)p − υL in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da n dg r o w sa tap a c eg.T h e t e r m (1 + g) appears
16in the numerator because the ﬁrst payment of p by the customer will be made at the
beginning of the next period; thus the ﬁrm has already grown for one period, while the
ﬁrst payment of L may occur this period with probability υ. This seems a quite intuitive
result, by paying d in the ﬁrst period using the mature technology, suppliers qualify for
a future ﬂow of payments that start with a payment (1+g)p and grow at a pace (1+g)
per period. In fact (1 + g) is not the actual growth rate of a successful customer, but
the expected rate of growth which accounts for the fact that customers are successful
with probability α. The expression for d also takes into account the possible payments
of the liquidity shock by the supplier.
Equation (8) together with equations (1), (2) and (3) uniquely determine the values of
all the endogenous variables.17 In particular, we can express d as a function of exogenous
variables only:
d = β
δ(αR − υL)(α − γ)(R − r) − (1 − βθ+ δγR)υL
1 − βθ− (β − δ)αR − δ(α − γ)r
(9)
It is useful to deﬁne ∆ =
βαR
1−βθ−(β−δ)αR−δ(α−γ)r so the expression for d becomes:
d = ∆(δ(R − r)(α − γ) − βυL) − βυL (10)
The initial payment d is a function of two terms that have a straightforward inter-
pretation. The ﬁrst term represents the payment that the supplier receives due to the
fact that she can extract all the extra “relationship surplus”. It is multiplied by ∆ that
is a scale factor. The term [δ(R − r)(α − γ) − βυL] represents how much surplus the
supplier will extract from the customer in future periods. The term δ(R − r)(α − γ) is
the excess productivity of the mature technology with respect to the startup technology
from the customer point of view; or in other words how much more productive is the
speciﬁc technology when compared to the generic one.18 This term can also be seen as a
measure of the degree of speciﬁcity of the speciﬁc technology. If either R = r or α = γ,
the advantage of the mature technology would not exist. The ﬁrst term −βυL within
the brackets accounts for potential future liquidity shocks. The second term −βυL rep-
resents the fact that the supplier expects to pay the liquidity shock on this period if it
happens. It can be interpreted as an insurance premium.
17In fact there are two possible mathematical solutions for p, d, S, N, M, s and n, but only one has
economic sense. The other one, determined by d =1− βθ, implies inﬁnite investment and negative
proﬁts for the customer in every stage of production.
18Investing one unit in the mature stage gives an expected value of β (c + θ + γR+( 1− γ)r), while
investing one unit in the startup stage gives β(c + θ + αR +( 1− α)r − υL). The diﬀerence between
t h e s et w ot e r m si si nf a c tβ [(R − r)(α − γ) − υL].




(δ(R − r)(α − γ) − βυL)+βυL (11)
This has exactly the same interpretation, although the scale factor is now ∆
(i−g)
(1+g).
Again there is a ﬁrst term that is positively related to the extra levels of productivity
when the technology is speciﬁc, plus a term that corresponds to the payment of an
insurance premium in the current period.19
Investment depends on the level of wealth of the ﬁrm and the attainable level of
leverage. While wealth is backward looking and consists of the accumulation of past
proﬁts, leverage is forward looking, so d depends on the future proﬁts that the supplier
can extract. This situation generates an ampliﬁcation mechanism. An increase of pro-
ductivity of the speciﬁc technology will increase the surplus extracted by the supplier
and therefore the level of leverage of the customer. This will increase the proﬁts of the
customer, thus increasing the surplus extracted by the supplier again, and so on. The
scale factors ∆ and ∆
(i−g)
(1+g) summarise this ampliﬁcation eﬀect in the following way. If
t h em a t u r et e c h n o l o g yb e c a m em o r ep r o d u c t i v eb yo n eu n i t( o rt h es t a r t u pt e c h n o l o g y
became less productive by one unit), d would grow by a factor of ∆ and p would grow
by a factor of ∆
(i−g)
(1+g).
The whole picture of the equilibrium arrangement between the supplier and the
customer is as follows: the existence of a technological link between them makes the
supplier get some (in this case all) of the extra surplus of the mature technology every
period. This guarantees the supplier a growing ﬂow of income, which will only stop if
the link is lost. As the customer can choose which supplier is going to get this ﬂow
of funds, the chosen supplier gives the customer in advance the expected future value
of this surplus share, thus making the implicit agreement look like a debt contract.
This is an equilibrium result and no actual contract needs to be written to enforce the
agreement. So the fact that returns may not be veriﬁable does not preclude the supplier
lending to the customer. The levels of debt depend positively on how important the link
is between the supplier and the customer. In the extreme case when suppliers can be
perfectly substituted, trade credit does not exist.
From an eﬃciency point of view this equilibrium is also the optimal arrangement for
the customer. Given that the customer has a technology with positive NPV, it is optimal
19Note that this expression for p is not fully exogenous, as g contains p in its denominator, the full









18to bring to the present as many funds as possible and invest them all. In equilibrium,
collateralisable returns are fully brought to the present through bank credit, and also
some of the non-contractible returns are brought to the present via trade credit. On top
of the debt-like agreement, suppliers also provide insurance against possible liquidity
shocks. In Section 3 we also show that the insurance arrangement is also optimal.
3 Supplier Insurance Versus Other Forms of Insur-
ance
So far, we have conjectured that the customer does not take any precautions against a
possible liquidity shock, in order to force the supplier to pay for it. We have seen that
the supplier will agree to pay it as long as the cost of the shock is suﬃciently small
when compared with the rents being extracted from the customer. Customers have
other potential strategies to deal with the payment of the liquidity shock. In particular,
they could have some precautionary saving or else they could sign an insurance contract
with a third party such as a bank. In this section we show that the optimal strategy for
customers is to use their suppliers as insurance providers.
The ﬁrst strategy that customers could use to face the liquidation shock is to have
some precautionary saving. That is, they could save in a bank account the discounted
full size of the shock βLI and use it if the shock hits. If the shock does not happen
these funds are added to the initial wealth of the ﬁrm at the beginning of the next
period. The other possible strategy is contracting insurance with a third party deep
pocket. We call this type of insurance bank insurance and it consists of paying a
fair insurance premium βυLI per period, to a bank who will pay the liquidity shock
whenever it happens.
In pure cost terms, bank insurance and supplier insurance are equivalent. However,
as we will see, supplier insurance will strictly dominate bank insurance in the pres-
ence of any contracting friction, veriﬁability problems or renegotiation. On the other
hand, precautionary saving is more costly than the other two strategies. Comparing the
precautionary saving strategy with the bank insurance, precautionary saving is equiva-
lent in expected returns to paying an insurance premium βυLI a n ds a v i n ga na m o u n t
β(1 − υ)LI for next period. But we know by proposition 1 and Assumption 6 that
saving is suboptimal with respect to investing, so precautionary saving is therefore dom-
inated by writing an insurance contract with a third party, that only involves paying
19the premium βυLI. So supplier insurance and bank insurance dominate precautionary
saving.20
The main advantage of supplier insurance with respect to bank insurance is that
it is an equilibrium result of the interaction between both commercial partners. It is
renegotiation proof, there is no need for a written contract and the supplier will always
bail out the customer, as long as the customer has not got any other way to face the
shock, and the continuation value for the supplier exceeds the cost of bailing out the
customer. Even if the shock is sometimes non veriﬁable and a written insurance contract
is not always enforceable the customer can still use the supplier as lender of last resort.
Also, to some extent, supplier insurance is unavoidable. Suppliers cannot credibly
commit not to bail out their customers if they experience a liquidity shock and they
do not have any funds or alternative insurance to cover it. So there will always be
an insurance premium included in the cost of trade credit. The only way to avoid
paying this premium is if the customer takes alternative precautions and can prove to
the supplier that no bail out will be needed. Therefore the implicit insurance contract
that the supplier oﬀers will necessarily be the dominant strategy whenever the liquidity
shock is not veriﬁable. It will also be the dominant strategy when the shock is veriﬁable
and an insurance contract can be written with a third party, but the customer cannot
“convince” the supplier that this insurance exists. This may prove a diﬃcult task as the
customer can secretly cancel the contract with the third party. If the supplier believed
that she would still have to pay for the shock anyway she will still charge the insurance
premium, thus the customer would be paying twice for the same cover. Any kind of
contracting costs would also give the advantage to supplier insurance.
Proposition 5 If customers can credibly commit to get bank insurance then bank in-
surance is equivalent to supplier insurance in cost terms.
Proof. See Appendix 1
Both banks and suppliers are deep pockets with the same discount rate. Both expect
to make zero proﬁts on average in their interaction with the customers. So it is an
intuitive result that the cost of getting insurance from either of the agents is the same.
One assumption that would give suppliers a cost advantage over third party insurers
would be if suppliers and customers were both cash constrained and had a lower discount
factor than banks.21 In this case suppliers would be cheaper insurers than banks because
20See Appendix 1 for details.
21For example if suppliers were also cash constrained and had access to a liquid and reversible produc-
20they would discount the insurance premium at more favourable terms. This eﬀect would
also be ampliﬁed by the multiplicator ∆ (see Section 2.6).22 Supplier’s impatience would
also make bank collateralised loans strictly preferred to supplier ones. The disadvantage
of this alternative model is that the cash holdings of the supplier have to be explicitly
modelled.23 We opted for this version with equal discount rates to keep the exposition
simple.
S of a rw eh a v ef o l l o w e dt h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no fLI as a monetary payment. However
we could also see it as the cost of a delay in production. This interpretation may be
closer to the phenomenon of late payment. If a customer production is delayed, suppliers
receive the next payment of p later on. The cost of this delay can be summarised by LI.
If we stick to this interpretation, supplier insurance would be completely unavoidable.
Suppliers would face the cost of this delay and they could cover themselves with a third
party if they wish to, but no insurance scheme on the customer’s side would be feasible.
Within the monetary interpretation of LI the only situation in which supplier insur-
ance would not be available would be if Assumption 7 did not hold. In this case, the
link between the supplier and the customer is too weak. The supplier would rather lose
the customer than pay LI. If this was the case, bank insurance would be the optimal
strategy for the customer.
4 Implicit Interest Rates
N o ww eh a v eaj u s t i ﬁcation for the high interest rates paid by customers for their trade
credit. The interest rate paid includes two premia that are not included in a bank credit.
The ﬁrst premium is a default premium and it is related to the ability of suppliers
to claim back debts, and also related to the extra risk that suppliers face. In the
model, bankers are lending with a collateral claim and their loans are virtually risk
free. However, suppliers are lending on the basis of their extra ability to get paid later
on, thanks to the technological speciﬁcity that links them with their customers. If this
speciﬁcity is lost in a bad production period, suppliers will not be able to extract any
tion technology that yielded more than 1
β units of non veriﬁable returns per period, per unit invested,
where they could invest their “spare” funds.
22Without going into the details of this alternative model; we can infer from the ﬁnal expressions for
p and d that if, for example, suppliers had also discount rate δ, the cost advantage of supplier insurance
would be (β − δ)(1 + ∆)υL i nt h ec a s eo fd and (β − δ)(1 + ∆
(i−g)
(1+g))υL in the case of p.
23For example, the structure of the model has to preclude that the supplier could strategically consume
all her funds to commit credibly not to bail out the customer.
21surplus from the relationship again. So from the point of view of suppliers, trade credit
looks like debt with default risk, and thus they have to charge a higher interest rate to
compensate for this extra risk. In reality, even though banks lend not only on collateral,
it seems reasonable to think that bank credit is in general safer than most trade credit.
The second -and perhaps the most interesting- reason why trade credit should be
more expensive than bank credit is that an insurance premium is charged by suppliers
to compensate for the cost of providing extra liquidity to their customers in case that
they have temporary liquidity needs. The fact that suppliers may be asked to provide
extra funds, or to extend the maturity of existing debts without charging an extra
penalty is foreseen in advance by them and they ask for a compensation in advance to
cover the expected costs of these future bail-outs.
How can we calculate an explicit expression for the interest rates charged on trade
credit in the model? One way is to consider the ﬁnancial relationship that links the
supplier and the customer as a perpetuity with a risk of default. We can ﬁnd the
interest rate ρ that makes d the fair price of a perpetuity that pays p times R
1−βθ+p on
the ﬁrst period and then has a growth rate of (1 + g1)= R
1−βθ+p.24






(1 + ρ)2 +
p(1 + g1)3
(1 + ρ)3 ++
p(1 + g1)4
(1 + ρ)4 ...
Our interest is to calculate the rate ρ that makes this equation hold. We already
know that d is such that suppliers break even when discounting at a rate i, so the
diﬀerence between ρ and i will be the default premium and the insurance premium paid
by customers. We can re-express d =
(1+g1)p
ρ−g1 in a similar fashion to equation (8).





And the diﬀerence between the market interest rate i and ρ is:




(1 + g)p − νL
d
− g (13)
We can now see the premium of the implicit interest rate ρ over the bank lending
rate that we have normalized to zero:
24Note that (1 + g1) is the actual growth rate of the ﬁrm if successful and should not be confused
with (1 + g)= Rα
1−θ+p which is the expected rate of growth before knowing if the ﬁrm is going to be
successful or not.







The premium is composed of two terms. The ﬁrst element of the premium is a
default premium. Suppliers know that if the customer ﬁrm is unsuccessful they will
not be able to receive any more payments from the customer. Default occurs with a
probability (1 − α) and g(1 +
p
d) accounts for the actual loss of future income after
default. Secondly, νL
d is an insurance premium that measures the foreseen payments
that the supplier may have to make to bail out customers with liquidity problems. The
term is just the expected cost of the liquidity shock over the amount lent. These two
premia explain the high cost of borrowing from suppliers. The high implicit interest
rates of trade credit with respect to bank credit account for a higher risk of default
of trade credit and the possibility that customers need to be bailed out or incur late
payments.
5 Empirical Analysis
The model of Sections 2 and 3 explains some of the stylized facts regarding trade credit
such as the apparently high interest rates implicit in the discount for early payment
and the existence of trade credit. Moreover, the model also has a series of testable
implications that can be used to assess its relevance and compare it with other competing
theories regarding trade credit. Three main empirical implications of the model are
tested in this section.
Firstly trade credit should grow as the link between a customer and a supplier be-
comes tighter: higher levels of trade credit are expected when intermediate goods are
very speciﬁc, when suppliers have private information about their customers or in gen-
eral when suppliers are costly to substitute.25 In the model, this is a direct consequence
of Expression ??.I d e a l l yo n ew o u l dl i k et oh a v ea nu n a m b i g u o u sm e a s u r eo ft h i sl i n k ,
but given the diverse nature of the relationship between suppliers and customers, it is
diﬃcult to ﬁnd a single measure that summarizes it. I overcome this problem by using
25The model does not address the idea of suppliers having superior information about their customers
directly. However any kind of informational advantage that would make customers more productive
with their long-term supplier than with an alternative one would ﬁt in the model. This is not to be
confused with informational asymmetries in the spirit of standard relationship lending models like in
Biais and Gollier (1997) where suppliers have an advantage in determining the creditworthiness of their
customers.
23a non parametric analysis that uses as a proxy for the degree of relationship between
suppliers and customers the age of recently created ﬁrms.
Secondly, as seen in Proposition ??, ﬁrms experiencing liquidity problems should use
their suppliers as lenders of last resort. I explore this relationship through two main
speciﬁcations. A non parametric analysis that links measures of trade credit and ﬁrm
performance and a regression analysis that relates trade credit to liquidity measures.
Finally, the proportion of trade credit used with respect to other forms of ﬁnance
should depend on the level of collateral that ﬁrms have. The higher the level of collater-
alizable assets, the lower the expected proportion of trade credit. This result is almost
imposed in the assumptions of the model. However it is relevant to test this assumption,
especially given that alternative theoretical models have given little or no attention at
all to the determination of the “mix” between trade credit and other forms of credit.26
To test the implications of the model I use a sub-sample of the FAME-Bureau Van
Dijk database. This database is collected by Jordans and Bureau Van Dijk for com-
mercial use and it includes balance sheet data, proﬁt and loss statements and some
complementary information on 210,000 ﬁrms from 1993 until 1999 including many small
and new-born ﬁrms. I restrict the analysis to manufacturing ﬁrms, retailers and whole-
salers reducing the sample to an unbalanced panel of approximately 55,000 ﬁrms with
an average of 4.5 observations per ﬁrm.27
This database presents two particular characteristics that make it specially appealing
for this problem. In the ﬁr s tp l a c e ,t h ed a t a s e tc o n t a i n s both quoted and not quoted
ﬁr m sa sw e l la sm a n ys m a l lﬁrms. Secondly, the high number of observations is ideal to
perform non-parametric estimations that are particularly important when some of the
implications tested are highly non linear. Using a panel also allows for controlling for
the presence of individual heterogeneity and for the possible endogeneity of trade credit
decisions. We use individual ﬁxed eﬀects and a GMM instrumental variables approach
in all the panel regressions to address these issues.
The remaining parts of this Section are as follows. In Section 5.1 I relate the levels
of trade credit taken to the age of new born ﬁrms; Section 5.2 explores the relationship
between ﬁrm performance and trade credit taken; ﬁnally Section 5.3 investigates how
26The change in trade credit over assets as a function of collateral can be seen in the model by taking
the derivative of Expresion ?? with respect to θ. The derivative is positive and grows with the degree
of the link.
27Id r o pﬁrms in sectors such as agriculture, ﬁshing, mining, ﬁnancial intermediation, other services,
real estate, public administration etc, because these are sectors in which buying intermediate goods
from a supplier represents a small part of the ﬁrm inputs and therefore trade credit is of little relevance.
24trade credit relates to the levels of collateral and liquid assets available to customers.
5.1 Trade Credit and Age of the Firm
The model predicts that trade credit should grow as the links between the supplier
and the customer grow. Ideally one would like to have a measure of the length of a
supplier-customer relationship regardless of the age of the customer ﬁrm, unfortunately
this information is not available in this dataset so newborn ﬁrms are used to extract this
information. In the model the build up of the relationship takes the form of a discrete
jump that follows a stochastic process: the level of trade credit of a new born ﬁrm is zero
up to a certain point in time, when the level of credit suddenly rises up to a level dmI.
In practice this process may be gradual as the links between a supplier and a customer
build up during long periods. To approximate this gradual process I use the model in
Section 2 to simulate the levels of trade credit of a “representative” ﬁrm instead of using
as i n g l eﬁrm. Figure 1 shows the average level of trade credit over assets of a population
of ﬁrms that are all “born” at the same time.28 This would correspond in practice to a
link that takes time to build and grows gradually. For example if the supplier and the
customer get to know each other and there is a process of learning by doing or if the
customer’s product gradually changed towards a ﬁnal and most productive speciﬁcation
that needs intermediate goods which are increasingly speciﬁc.
To test empirically whether this hump shape is actually present in the dataset I
run a non-parametric regression which shows the non linear relationship between the
level of trade credit over assets and the age of the ﬁrm. In particular I run a local
linear regression since it is the non-parametric regression that has the best asymptotic
properties for the studied problem. In essence the local linear smoother is a way to
summarize a scatterplot graph into a non-parametric function.29
Figure 2 shows a local linear regression for the whole sample, with a window of 5000
ﬁrms and equal weights for each observation.30 I compute the standard deviation of
28The simulation is done for 5000 ﬁrms and 20 years, the parameters are γ =0 .1,α=0 .9,θ=0 .7,
r =0 .15,R=0 .35,β=0 .85,υ=0 .2; L =0 .05.
29See Fan (1992) for a thorough explanation of the local linear estimation. This type of non-parametric
estimation has the advantage with respect to other techniques (such as a Nadaraya-Watson estimator
Nadaraya, 1964 and Watson, 1964) of being a consistent estimator even in the tails of the estimation
and in the presence of frequency clustering among the data. This is particularly useful here, where the
results for the ﬁrms in the left tail of the estimation are the most important and considering that the
density of ﬁrms in diﬀerent age intervals of the sample is not constant.
30The results of the estimation are robust to diﬀerent choces of bandwith. n=5000 has a good balance
between the ﬂexibility of the estimator and its precision.
25the estimator and show a 95% conﬁdence interval. As shown, the level of trade credit
grows until the third year of the age of the ﬁrm, it stays at this maximum level until
the ﬁfth year, and then gradually goes down during the next periods. This is consistent
with the prediction of the model. Customers do not receive much credit from their
suppliers straight away but it takes time to build up the link with their suppliers that
is necessary for borrowing. So far, other empirical studies based on linear regressions
found a negative relationship between trade credit and age. This corresponds in Figure
2 to the negative slope from the ﬁfth year onwards. The non-linear approach, also allows
us to identify the initial increase of trade credit in the early years of a supplier-customer
relationship. The 95% conﬁdence interval reﬂects the lower density of ﬁrms in the left
tail but it is suﬃciently narrow to accept a hump shaped pattern.
Two features seem to make the results of Figure 2 slightly diﬀerent to the one pre-
dicted by the simulation. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is that the levels of trade credit of new-born
ﬁrms are not zero. In the model, trade credit of a new-born ﬁrm is zero because trade
credit is assumed to be completely unenforceable and there are no links between suppli-
ers and customers. In reality trade credit is not completely unenforceable by law, so even
if the levels of speciﬁcity of suppliers for new ﬁrms are low there is still scope for credit.
In addition, signiﬁcant links between suppliers and customers may already be in place
at the very beginning of their interaction; for example, if there are sunk costs or search
costs associated with ﬁnding a supplier or if the customer already has a very detailed
blueprint of the necessary intermediate goods, even at very early stages of the ﬁrm life.
Another reason why there is scope for positive levels of trade credit use for new-born
ﬁrms is that it can be used as a transaction device.31 The second main diﬀerence be-
tween the simulation and the results of the non-parametric regression is that the level
of trade credit also seems to go down as the ﬁrms grow older after the ﬁfth year. This
m e a n st h a tt r a d ec r e d i ti ss h r i n k i n g ,o ra tl e a s tt h a ti ti sn o tg r o w i n ga tt h es a m ep a c e
as the assets of the ﬁrm. By checking the evolution of other parts of the balance sheet
with age, I found that this decrease is mainly due to the growth in retained earnings
that allows ﬁrms to substitute trade credit with cheaper sources of ﬁnance. It is also due
t ot h ef a c tt h a ta sﬁrms get older their expected rate of investment goes down, so they
no longer exhaust their borrowing capacity and they start reducing their most expensive
loans (i.e. trade credit).
31Ferris (1981) sees trade credit as a means of payment to reduce transaction costs when the timing of
the arrival of new supplies is uncertain. This is consistent with the existence of a free delayed payment
period like the ﬁrst ten days in the “2-10 net 30” deal. However, the model remains silent about why
trade credit is so expensive and why ﬁrms are willing to pay such costs.
26The use of a local linear regression has the advantage of a very ﬂexible estimation of
the non-linear structure of this problem. However, it has the major drawback of being a
bivariate analysis that does not correct for the possible inﬂuence of other variables. The
results may be due not only to the build up of a link between suppliers and customers,
but may be driven by the existence of other variables such as size or the level of activity
of the ﬁrm that are correlated with both age and trade credit. To make sure that this is
not the case, I also show the results of spline regressions that are not as ﬂexible as the
local linear smoother, but allow to control for other relevant variables. Spline regressions
are just linear regressions in which a “spline” variable is constructed to estimate a non
linear relationship as piecewise linear. The results of this regression are shown in Figure
3. To generate it I use one spline for each year of age between zero and 20, and linear
controls for size, inventories, collateral levels, deposits and year dummies measured as
in Section 5.3 are introduced.
The results are not qualitatively diﬀerent to the ones shown in Figure 2. Again there
is a rise of trade credit in the early years of life of a ﬁrm, that is now sharper in the second
year than in the ﬁrst one, and stabilizes around the third to ﬁfth year of age of the ﬁrm,
leading to a substitution in the next years of trade credit by other sources of ﬁnance.
The rise of trade credit is still signiﬁcant in the spline regression after controlling for the
levels of activity of the ﬁrm and its size.
Even though the time series interaction between trade credit and bank credit is not
studied explicitly, the results of the previous regressions, and the implications of the
basic model shed some light on the issue of whether trade credit and bank credit should
be considered as substitutes or complementary to each other. While ﬁrms are ﬁnancially
constrained extra levels of trade credit may allow ﬁrms to increase their available bank
credit through higher collateral value. Similarly, higher levels of bank credit may increase
the purchases made to suppliers, increasing the size of the purchases made to customers
and therefore the amount of available trade credit. So for constrained ﬁrms, trade credit
and bank credit will behave as complementaries. This would correspond with the upward
sloping part of the graph. However, if ﬁrms are not cash constrained typically bank and
trade credit will behave as substitutes. Whenever a ﬁrm that uses both bank and trade
credit has extra borrowing capacity with banks it will substitute some costly trade credit
with cheaper bank credit. This would correspond with the downward sloping part of the
graph.
275.2 Trade Credit and Firm Performance
The model predicts that when the links between suppliers and customers are strong,
suppliers will have an incentive to give ﬁnancial help to their customers who experience
temporary liquidity shocks. This again predicts higher levels of trade credit when the
relationship surplus between the buyer and the seller is big, so it is consistent with the
previous results, but there are more detailed ways to test if this ﬁnancial support is
present in reality.
The high cost of trade credit induces customers to use it as a ﬁnancial instrument only
when other forms of ﬁnance are scarce. When ﬁrms are growing fast and undertaking
new investments, trade credit should grow; just because other forms of ﬁnance may not
be available. Also when customers experience problems they may need to ﬁnance a
higher proportion of their purchase on trade credit and use late payment as a way to
increase the amount of ﬁnance that they receive from their suppliers. Suppliers will be
willing to ﬁnance their customers in trouble as long as the value of their relationship with
them is higher than the cost of helping them. These two eﬀects imply an expected “U”
shaped distribution of the relative levels of trade credit with respect to a “performance
measure”. The ﬁrms that are doing best and the ones suﬀering slight problems should
be the ones that borrow more from their suppliers. To check if this relationship holds
in reality, I run a local linear regression relating the level of trade credit over assets to
the growth rate of the assets of the ﬁrms in the sample. 32 The reason why I use asset
growth rates as a "performance measure" is that it is the best variable that one can
obtain from balance sheet data. The proﬁt and loss statements are only available for
as m a l ls u b s a m p l eo fﬁrms. It is also the variable that is closest in interpretation to
the growth rates of the model. This estimation is shown in Figure 4. The predicted
U-shaped relationship is conﬁrmed by the data.
Trade credit is highest for the ﬁr m st h a tg r o wa tah i g h e rp a c e . T h i si sc o n s i s t e n t
with the fact that trade credit is relatively expensive and ﬁrms use it only when they
need to use all their borrowing capacity and have exhausted other available sources of
ﬁnance (i.e. when they experience high growth rates). Also, new-born ﬁrms are the
ones with higher levels of growth and higher levels of trade credit, as seen in Section
32Firms that have no activity, have little or no trade credit (as they do not purchase anything). They
also have growth rates that are close to zero. For this reason I have not included in the estimation
ﬁrms that declare to be dormant, ﬁrms that are pure asset holders, declare zero sales or post exactly
the same balance sheet for two consecutive years to avoid the chance that they could artiﬁcially drive
the results. Including these ﬁrms would induce us to estimate an unrealistic low level of trade credit
for low growth ﬁrms.
285.1. The average borrowing capacity limit seems to be around 22%, while the minimum
average borrowing level is around 14%. Note that these levels seem to coincide with the
ones of Figure 2. This does not mean that these are the minimum and maximum levels
for any individual ﬁrm but only shows what is the typical range of trade credit use as a
proportion over total assets.
The most interesting feature of the results in Figure 4 is on the left-hand side, where
ﬁrms that experience slight problems (small-medium negative growth rates up to -30%)
seem to have relatively high levels of trade credit when compared with ﬁrms that have
low growth rates. This means that suppliers still lend to these ﬁrms that are suﬀering
problems, so trade credit grows or at least does not shrink at the same rate as assets
do. This is evidence in favour of suppliers seen as lenders of last resort. The help that
suppliers provide to their customers is probably not given by a monetary transfer, but
most likely by accepting late payment of already extended debts and supplying more
intermediate goods on credit. However, suppliers do not seem to give extra ﬁnance to
ﬁrms that experience serious problems (i.e. ﬁrms that halve their assets or worse) in
the far left-hand side of the ﬁgure. For these ﬁrms, trade credit decreases even more
than assets, so there is a reduction of trade credit over assets for ﬁrms experiencing
strong problems that comes from the supply side of it. This can be explained within
the model by a liquidity shock that is too big to be paid by suppliers, or in other words
a shock that violates Assumption 7. Finally, ﬁrms in the middle range (zero growth
and small positive growth rates) have relatively low levels of trade credit. In the model
this is justiﬁed because these are unsuccessful ﬁrms with low links with their suppliers.
In practice, other complementary reasons may also be causing this slump. First, low
growth ﬁrms may have lower ﬁnance needs, so they use cheaper ways of ﬁnance than
trade credit. Second, ﬁrms that are not growing much may be buying relatively low
levels of intermediate goods, thus making it more diﬃcult for them to have high levels
of trade credit.
Again, one could be worried about the bivariate nature of the previous estimation.
To see if the results are biased because I do not control for other variables, I also show
the results of a spline regression that has other linear regressors. For Figure 5 I use
a spline regression on asset growth rate where each spline spans over 5% of the total
sample, controlling for size, inventories, collateral levels, deposits and ﬁrm dummies.33
The results of Figure 5 do not diﬀer from the ones obtained in Figure 4. The ﬁrms
33To allow for extra ﬂexibility of the estimation we have split the ﬁr s tl e f th a n ds i d es p l i n ei nt w o ,s o
each one represents 2.5% of the sample.
29that use trade credit more extensively seem to be the ones that are growing at a very
fast pace, but also the ones that are experiencing temporary problems. This result again
points in the direction of suppliers helping their customers in need of extra ﬁnance,
especially in periods of ﬁnancial distress. Note that the levels of trade credit over assets
also go down in this regression for the worst ﬁrms of the sample, (i.e. the ones with
negative growth rates of -30% or worse), so suppliers are able to recover their debts
even faster than the rate at which assets are shrinking. As a whole the results of this
regression conﬁrm those in Figure 4.
5.3 Collateral and Liquid Assets
This section analyzes the eﬀects of collateral and liquid assets on trade credit, while
controlling for other relevant variables. In the model all bank credit is fully collateralized
while trade credit corresponds to risky and completely unsecured debts. In practice, this
absolute dichotomy need not be true; part of bank lending is not secured by collateral
and trade creditors can sometimes claim the goods supplied by them in case of default.
This section explores how the proportion between trade credit and other forms of debt
evolves as ﬁrms have more or less collateral, to assess whether the modelling assumption
is reasonable. It also checks if the levels of trade credit rise when ﬁrms experience
liquidity shocks. The level of cash and deposits that the ﬁr mh a si su s e da saw a yo f
measuring the liquidity needs of the ﬁrm. Ap r i o r ione would expect that a ﬁrm will
use less trade credit the higher the level of cash and deposits.
I report regressions that use two alternative dependent variables: the ratio of trade
credit over total debt (including trade credit) and the proportion of trade credit over
assets. This second dependent variable is introduced to avoid a possible conmovement
of short-term trade credit and other debt instruments when ﬁrms experience liquidity
shocks.34
Trade credit terms are very stable along time within an industry and also at a
ﬁrm level, generating a lot of inertia in trade credit use. To capture this inertia I
use ﬁxed eﬀect regressions that control for any permanent unobserved heterogeneity at
a ﬁrm level that shifts in an additive way the use of trade credit. Even though all
regressions include time dummies, there could be diﬀerent trends at a sector level that
34In the current parametrization of our model ﬁrms do not hold any precautionary saving. However
this may happen in equilibrium or if there is a small probability that a liquidity shock may exceed the
value of the relationship for the supplier (i.e. L>m ). Firms may also hold some liquid assets for
transaction purposes (Ferris 1981).
30could artiﬁcially drive the results. That is why sector time trends are also included at a
3 digit SIC level. Furthermore, given that the estimates could be subject to endogeneity
problems I also report the Arellano-Bond (GMM) estimator that allows the estimation
of a ﬁxed eﬀect regression that also includes a lagged dependent variable. The Arellano-
Bond estimator uses an instrumental variable GMM procedure to avoid the problems
of endogeneity associated with using a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator when there is potential
autocorrelation of the dependent variable.35 The Arellano-Bond estimator also corrects
for any contemporaneous endogeneity problems and not just for the ones associated with
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Random eﬀects (GLS) estimations were
also run. Given that the Haussman test rejected the hypothesis of equality of coeﬃcients
in both regressions, these GLS estimators are not reported.
The independent variables are four control variables and two variables of interest.
The variables of interest are the amount of tangible assets (land, buildings, machinery,
vehicles, etc.) over total assets as a measure of the level of collateral, also the proportion
of cash and deposits over total assets that the ﬁrm has as a measure of the liquid assets
of the ﬁrm, to account for the liquidity needs of the ﬁrm. The control variables are the
log of the assets of the ﬁrm (in thousand pounds); used as a control variable to correct
for the size of the ﬁrm. The proportion of inventories that the ﬁrm holds over assets
reﬂects the level of activity of the ﬁrm.36 The level of inventories over assets allows to
control for the level of activity of both big and small ﬁrms. I also include as control
variables year dummies, the age of the ﬁrms in years and their asset growth rate to have
am e a s u r eo fﬁrm performance.37 The results of these last two variables are not reported
as the last two sections already provide a more detailed analysis of them. The results of
these regressions can be seen in Table 3.
The results in Table 3 show that the prediction of the model with respect to the
eﬀect of the level of collateral is conﬁrmed by the data. Columns 1 to 3 show the
results of regresions that use as dependent variable the ratio of trade credit to total
debt. The result regarding collateral is that ﬁrms have a higher level of collateral use a
lower proportion of trade credit and higher proportions of bank credit and other forms
35The Arellano-Bond estimator allows for the unbiased and consistent estimation of the coeﬃcients
of a model of the type yit = δyit−1 + βxit + εit + δi where εit is a standard error term and δi is an
individual error term, by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences and using several lagged dependent variables (in ﬁrst
diﬀferences also) as instruments. See Arellano and Bond (1991).
36Another possibility could be to use the level of sales, unfortunately many ﬁrms in the sample do
not report their level of sales, and this is particularly true for the smaller ﬁrms of the sample.
37I dropped observations with asset growth rates higher than 100%.
31of ﬁnance. The coeﬃcients associated with collateral are important also in quantitative
terms; moving from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile of the collateral over
assets variable would mean a decrease of the level of trade credit over total debt between
4.9% and 6.5%. This supports the assumption of bank credit being highly related to
collateral while trade credit corresponds to unsecured debts. In the UK the eﬀective
level of collateral attached to trade credit is very low, suppliers are very rarely able to
reclaim the goods delivered in case of default and the recovery rates in case of liquidation
are also very low.38 The coeﬃcient of lagged trade credit over total debt on the current
ratio of trade credit over total debt in the GMM regression is 0.51, showing that there
is a strong autocorrelation of trade credit across periods.
The level of trade credit over total debt decreases when ﬁrms reduce their level of
cash and liquid assets; this seems contradictory with the idea that trade credit can be a
tool that ﬁrms use to overcome liquidity restrictions, however the result could be due to
t h ef a c tt h a to t h e rs o u r c e so fﬁnance also increase when the ﬁrm experiences temporary
liquidity shocks. To clarify this point, columns 4 to 6 show the results when we use as
dependent variable the level of trade credit over total assets. This variable should not
be inﬂuenced by this conmovement
The result with respect to liquid assets is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the
regression of trade credit over total assets. Buyers use more trade credit when they are
more liquidity constrained. This seems an obvious strategy given the high cost associated
with getting credit from your suppliers. The traditional wisdom of “pay late, get paid
early” does not seem to be optimal when one takes into account that the early payment
discounts are commonly very generous.
Again higher levels of collateral are associated with a lower proportion of trade credit
and higher proportions of bank credit and other forms of ﬁnance, although the coeﬃcient
is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst two regressions. Note that while the model predicts that
the proportion of trade credit over total debt should decrease with the proportion of
collateral, the predictions of the model regarding the levels of trade credit over assets
are ambiguous, since the composition eﬀect of a lower proportion of trade credit/debt
could be compensated by a higher level of leverage. However, the two regressions seem
point in the same direction. Again the GMM estimation shows a strong autocorrelation
of trade credit through diﬀerent periods.
38Franks and Sussman (1999)
326C o n c l u s i o n s
We have shown that the existence of trade credit may be justiﬁed as a result of the inter-
action between a supplier and a customer that engage in speciﬁc production processes
in a context of limited enforceability of debts.
A certain technological speciﬁcity gives suppliers an advantage in enforcing non-
collateralised debts. This advantage allows them to lend beyond the maximum amount
that banks are willing to lend. As a result, trade credit can exist even in the presence of a
competitive banking sector. Customers are rationed in the bank credit market, so trade
credit allows them to increase their leverage. The extra enforceability power of suppliers
comes from the fact that they can threaten to stop supplying intermediate goods to their
customers. In the presence of some kind of product speciﬁcity or a certain link between
the supplier and the customer, ﬁnding a new supplier is costly, so customers will pay
back their debts before switching to another supplier.
However, this link works both ways. Not only are customers more willing to repay
their suppliers, but suppliers will forgive debts and extend the maturity period of their
credit when customers experience temporary liquidity shocks that may threaten their
survival. In practice; ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress generally delay the payment of their due
trade credit. This late payment rarely carries a monetary penalty, nor a cut in the ﬂow
of intermediate goods to the debtor. Their suppliers are eﬀectively providing liquidity
(as a continuous ﬂow of intermediate goods sold on credit) as a means of increasing the
survival chances of their customer. The model predicts that this type of insurance is
more likely when the links between buyers and sellers are stronger, or in other words
suppliers are more likely to help their customers if it is very costly for them to ﬁnd a
new customer.
Even though we speak about technological speciﬁcity, the ties between the supplier
and the customer are not explicitly modelled. However, we can think of broader indus-
trial links that are not strictly technological that would still sustain the results of this
analysis. Any kind of sunk cost (legal procedures, bargaining costs, search costs, etc.)
attached with starting a new commercial relationship, or production processes that ben-
eﬁt from learning by doing, or the build-up of reputation and trust between commercial
partners would have similar eﬀects.
Some of the implications of the model are supported by the empirical evidence. The
evolution of trade credit levels with the age of the ﬁrm shows that suppliers do not lend
much to their customers at the beginning of their commercial relationship, but the levels
33of credit build up as the relationship evolves. The building up of trade credit in the early
years of a ﬁrm reinforces the interpretation of trade credit as a result of the existence of
some degree of speciﬁcity between a supplier and her customers.
The empirical results also show that trade credit is used in the margin, when other
forms of credit have already been exhausted. High growth ﬁrms, that need as much
ﬁnance as possible, together with ﬁrms experiencing liquidity problems are the ones
that get a higher proportion of credit from their suppliers. This seems a reasonable
strategy given that trade credit is a relatively expensive form of ﬁnance. Finally, the
proportion of trade credit with respect to other forms of ﬁnance seems to be highly
dependent on the levels of collateral. Higher levels of collateral mean a lower proportion
of trade credit. This is consistent with the hypothesis of ﬁrms exhausting other available
forms of credit before using trade credit as a source of ﬁnance. Theseesults are consistent
with the theoretical model developed in the ﬁrst part of the paper and challenge some
of the results of other theoretical models.
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377 Appendix 1
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The customer has two basic strategies when using the startup technology: one is to
invest all possible funds in the project, the other one is to invest minimum funds in the
project (i.e. almost zero) and only invest all funds when using the mature technology.
All other strategies are linear combinations of these two, so if we prove that investing
all funds dominates investing almost zero, we will prove that it dominates all other
strategies. To prove this we use the unimprovability principle that says that a strategy
is optimal if we cannot ﬁnd a “one-shot” deviation that improves the strategy.39 To do
so we compare the strategy of investing all possible funds with the “one-shot deviation”
strategy of investing minimum funds on the ﬁrst startup period and then investing all
possible funds in any other period (even if the prototype strategy is used again). If this
“one-shot deviation” is not an improvement, the unimprovability principle guarantees
that deviating in any further period is suboptimal too. The value function of investing




(γN +( 1− γ)S) (15)
We want to show that there exists a value δ
∗ (0,β) such as for every δ<δ
∗ it is
optimal to invest all available funds even when using the prototype technology.
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F o ra n yo t h e rv a l u e so fδ we can evaluate S 





S so S  = S =⇒ δ<β S
γN+(1−γ)S
Then δ
∗ = β S
S+γ(N−S). For δ<δ
∗ investing as much as possible in the prototype
technology is the optimal strategy. We know that S
S+γ(N−S) (0,1) given that N>Sand
that both N and S are positive and increasing in δ, so we can determine that δ
∗ (0,β).
Moreover the equilibrium function for S  −S =0is a continuous quadratic function
in δ,s ot h e r ei sas i n g l ev a l u ef o rδ in the interval (0,β) such that δ
∗ = β S
S+γ(N−S).This
is because there are two solutions for δ
∗ such that S  − S =0but given that S 
S > 1 if
δ = β and S 
S < 1 if δ =0then only one of the solutions lies between 0 and β. This
means that there is a unique δ
∗ (0,β) so it is also true that if δ>δ
∗, investing as little
as possible in the startup technology is the optimal strategy.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 4
As suppliers make a “take it or leave it ” oﬀer, they can choose the optimal level of p up
to the point when M = S where customers would opt for their outside option of going
39See Kreps (1990) for an intuitive explanation of the unimprovability principle.
38back to the startup technology. Using the unimprovability principle again we can prove
that “one-shot” deviations from this strategy do not pay, by taking the continuation m
as given and constant m a n dt h e nt a k i n gt h ed e r i v a t i v eo fm with respect to p which
is m0 =
1−θ−βαRm+υL
(−1−p+θ)2 . This derivative is positive as long as m<1−θ+υL
βαR . We know that
1−θ+υL
βαR > 1 and m =
β(α−γ)(R−r)
1−βθ−βr(α−γ)+kRδυ < 1 by Assumption 4 so one-shot deviations
from setting p at maximum level do not pay. By the unimprovability principle we can
now be sure that other deviations are also suboptimal.
7.3 Proof of the Dominance of “Supplier Insurance” and “Bank
Insurance” Over Precautionary Saving




(1 − d − βθ+ L)
δ[c +( αR +( 1− υ)L)M +( 1− α)rS]
Mp =
1
(1 + p − βθ+ L)
δ[c +( αR +( 1− υ)L)M +( 1− α)rS)]
We use the subscript p to denote precautionary saving. The value function when search-
ing remains the same. Using precautionary saving is equivalent to paying a premium
L at the beginning of the period and getting it back with probability (1 − υ).T h i s
is equivalent in expected terms to paying a premium υL and saving (1 − υ)L for one
period. Bank insurance entails paying υL and no saving. We know from Proposition
1 and Assumption 6 that saving is suboptimal even in the startup stage so it is also
suboptimal in the mature stage. Thus bank insurance dominates precautionary saving.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The expressions below (marked by the subscript b) show the value functions if the
customer decides to use bank insurance.
Nb =
1
(1 − db − βθ+ βυL)
δ(c + αRMb +( 1− α)rSb)
Mb =
1
(1 + pb − βθ+ βυL)
δ(c + αRMb +( 1− α)rSb)
The leverage factor of the customers ﬁrm has only gone down by υLwhich is the expected




(1 − db − βθ+ βυL)
{−db + β(αRmb +( 1− α)rsb)}
nb =
1
(1 − db − βθ+ βυL)
{−db + β(αRmb +( 1− α)rsb)}
The solutions for p and d for this case, taking into account that M = S, n =0and
equations (4) and (1) are:
db = β∆
µ














So db = d + βυL and pb = p − βυL.
398 Appendix 2: Sample Structure and Summary Statis-
tics
In Table 1 we report the composition of our sample by year, and ﬁrm size, measured
both as size in assets and size in terms of number of employees.40 We show the number
of observations for the diﬀerent categories. The sample contains up to 5 observations
per ﬁrm.41
Table 1: Sample composition: Number of ﬁrms by year and size
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Observations 1551 8681 41593 48578 50799 51245 43941 243338
%o ft o t a ls a m p l e 0.63 3.52 16.88 19.72 20.62 20.80 17.83 100
Size (Assets-£M) <0.1 .1-.25 .25-1 1-5 5-50 50-500 >500 Total
Observations 3816 10024 54126 110717 56120 9597 1494 246388
%o ft o t a ls a m p l e 1.54 4.06 21.9 44.93 22.77 3.89 0.6 100
Size (Employees) <5 5-50 50-250 250-500 500-5k 5k-25k >25k Total
Observations 7797 67319 65092 11973 12168 1078 289 169472
%o ft o t a ls a m p l e 4.60 39.72 38.40 7.06 7.17 0.63 0.17 100
Considering the distribution of the sample by year, most of the ﬁrms are sampled
between 1995 and 1999. Data is only available at most for ﬁve years per ﬁrm. This
makes the distribution to concentrate in the last ﬁve possible years. With respect to
ﬁrm size we can see how relatively small ﬁrms are represented in the ﬁrm. A percentage
of 27% of the ﬁrm-observations in the sample have less than £1 million assets and 44%
of them have less than 50 employees. As the amount of ﬁrms represented in the sample
is quite high, this leaves us with a good number of small ﬁrms. This is particularly
important when dealing with empirical evidence regarding trade credit, as trade credit
is likely to be more important for small ﬁrms that typically have less alternative sources
of ﬁnance.42
In Table 2 we also report the summary statistics for the diﬀerent variables that we
are going to use throughout our empirical analysis. We report the mean and the variance
of the diﬀerent variables, as well as three position measures. The sample median, the
value for the 10% quantile and 90% quantile. These values can be used to evaluate the
quantitative importance of the diﬀerent results in our regressions.43
40Assets for Table 1 are reported in £ Million.
41For most ﬁrms (75%) we have the last 5 observations available (eg. 1995-1999, 1994-1998 etc) others
have less than 5 observations. The average observations per ﬁrm is 4.4.
42The proportion of big ﬁrms in our sample is much higher than the one in the country as a whole.
However, given that the regressions of this chapter constitute a conditional analysis, the fact that we
have a stratiﬁed sample should not bias our results. The stratiﬁed nature of the sample, should only be
a problem if we wanted to do a descriptive analysis of variables like: the average ﬁrm size or the average
use of trade credit When reporting these statistics, one has to be aware that the fact that big ﬁrms are
oversampled in our dataset makes these descriptive statistics biased, so they are not representative of
the UK economy as a whole.
43Some of the variables used in our estimations are ratios over the level of assets of the ﬁrm. This
means that we may get some extreme results when the assets of the ﬁrm are close to zero. Calculating
the summary statistics of the following ratios: trade credit over assets, trade credit growth rate, trade
credit over sales; we have excluded from the calculation the top (bottom) 1% of the observations, to
avoid unusually high values when the denominator of these ratios is too close to zero. We also drop
these observations in further estimations whenever one of these ratios appears in the regression.
40Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable mean Std. dev. median 10% qt. 90% qt.
Assets 22270 343074 2081 365 18683
Employees 329 2965 59 9 394
Trade credit 2500 29826 263 0 2874
Trade credit/Assets 0.18 0.18 0.13 0 0.44
Trade credit/Sales 0.10 0.12 0.08 0 0.21
Trade credit growth rate 0.13 0.71 0.02 -0.54 0.85
Trade credit/Total debt 0.43 0.32 0.41 0 0.94
Inventories 3483 37935 318 0 3618
Inventories/Assets 0.21 0.19 0.17 0 0.48
Short-term bank loans 4147 68126 200 0 3555
St banks/Total Liabilities 0.26 0.27 0.18 0 0.66
Long-term bank loans 5 2944 58111 0 0.35
Lt banks/Total Liabilities 0.10 0.17 0.005 0 0.35
Inventories/Assets 0.21 0.19 0.17 0 0.48
Liquid assets 1412 28944 44 0 1245
Liquid assets/Assets 0.9 0.15 0.2 0 0.30
Age (Years) 23 - 17 4.6 >100
Asset Growth Rates 0.05 0.28 0.06 -0.20 0.33
Collateral 6640 138308 337 7 10904
Collateral/Assets 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.007 0.54
Proﬁts before tax 2435 42567 149 -64 1927
Return on assets 0.09 0.24 0.07 -0.03 0.24
Return on equity 0.16 11.8 0.25 -0.09 1.21
Monetary variables in thousand pounds.
We can see in the last two tables that the size distribution of our sample is skewed
towards smaller ﬁrms. Most of the variables related to the size of the ﬁrm such as
assets or level of trade credit have average levels higher than the median. This is a
characteristic of the population of ﬁrms in the UK rather than a special property of our
sample, that contains all the big UK ﬁrms and only a subsample of the small ones. This
points out that our sample is composed mainly by a big group of small and medium
ﬁrms, but also that all the biggest ﬁrms of the UK are also included in the sample.
More than half of the ﬁrms in our sample have less than 60 employees, while there is
almost 10% of the ﬁrms in the sample with more than 300 employees.
With respect to trade credit, the average level of trade credit over assets is 18%
although the variability of this ratio is quite high, as going from the 10th percentile
to the 90th percentile means moving from zero trade credit to a 44% of trade credit
over assets. When we measure trade credit as a proportion of sales, the average level
falls to 10%, with decile values of zero and 21%. This shows that sales are normally
bigger than assets on a per ﬁrm basis, but also the fact that not all the ﬁrms in our
sample report a ﬁgure for sales, being the smallest ﬁrms the ones for which we have less
information about their sales and their proﬁt and loss statement. As a guide for this
lack of information about sales, while we have 243338 observations for asset levels, we
only have 109387 observations regarding sales. The average size of the ﬁrms that report
sales in term is £36701k of assets while for the ones that do not report a sales ﬁgure,
the average level of assets is £18536.
The median age of the ﬁrms in our sample is 17 years, with ﬁrms of all ages repre-
sented, including more than 10% of the sample being ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n1 0 0y e a r s
of age. If we wanted to do regressions concerning the age of the ﬁrm for all ﬁrms, this
41would pose a problem, as a ﬁrm of more than 100 years of age may have suﬀered several
restructurings, and therefore be “re-born” in some sense after foundation. This is not
going to be a problem in our regressions that relate trade credit to ﬁr ma g ea sw ea r e
only interested in the youngest ﬁrms of our sample. In particular, the regressions that
use ﬁr ma g ea sad e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ew i l lc o n c e n t r a t eo nas u b s a m p l eo fﬁrms of less than
20 years of age. This subsample of observations of ﬁr m sb e l o w2 0y e a r so fa g ec o n t a i n s
34440 ﬁrms and 137907 observations.
429 Appendix 3: Trade Credit of a Steady Growing
Firm
Typical trade credit contracts may not actually look like a perpetuity. The customer
orders some goods and pays for them after some time. However, if we take all the cash
ﬂows of an ongoing commercial relationship ﬁn a n c e db yt r a d ec r e d i ti tl o o k ss i m i l a rt o
a perpetuity contract.
For example, suppose a customer ﬁrm starts with a level of input purchases of 100
units and ﬁnances 75% of those via trade credit. The ﬁrm sales and input needs grow
at a 10% and the implicit interest rate on trade credit is 35%.
In the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm gets 75 units of goods from the supplier and pays nothing,
so the customer is getting the value of 75 units from the supplier. In the second period,
the customer has to pay 101.25 units (75∗1.35) to the supplier, as capital and interests of
the ﬁrst delivery, but the customer also receives 82.5 new input units to be used in this
second period (corresponding to 75% of 110 units needed). In net terms the customer
is eﬀectively paying 18.75 units to the supplier and paying cash for the new deliveries.
T h ep r o c e s sc o n t i n u e sa si nF i g u r e9 .
Figure 9
































Sales (10% growth rate) TC I ssued TC Repaid (35% Implicit Rate) Cash Flow
Here trade credit looks like a perpetuity with an initial payment of 75 units, and
a ﬁrst coupon of 18.75 that grows at a 10% rate. Moreover, if we call d the capital
payment and (1+g1)p the ﬁrst payment, the relationship (1+g1)p = d(1+ρ)−(1+g1)d
holds and implies equation (12).
4310 Appendix 4 Tables and Figures
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Table 3: Collateral and Liquidity
Panel Data Regressions
Dependent Variable: Trade Credit/Total Debt Trade Credit/Assets
1234 5 6
(T. C./Tot. Debt)t−1 - - 0.458*
(51.31)
- - -


















































Sector time trends No Yes No No Yes No
All regresions include as control variables:ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, year dummies, asset growth rates
and age.(not reported).
Columns 3 and 6 use the GMM Arellano-Bond estimation procedure
GMM estimator uses ﬁrst diﬀerences and inclues up to 3 lags as instrumental variables
t-statistic in parenthesis (z-statistic for GMM)
* indicates signiﬁcant at 99%
Size: Log. of total assets; Inventories: Finished and work in progress stocks/total assets;
Collateral: Fixed assets / total assets; Liquid assets: Cash and liquid deposits
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